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Over the all too many years it took to research and to write
Matters of Mind: The University in Ontario, 1791-1951 (1994), one
of my greatest regrets was the fact that no general history of the
University of Toronto had appeared since the 1920s.  Appointed
University Historian by his good friend Claude Bissell, former
professor of  English Robin S. Harris had been mandated to
produce a comprehensive history of the University of Toronto. But
by the 1980s Harris  had  reached the conclusion—or so rumour
had it—that no adequate history of any university of over 6,000
students could be written.  The University of Toronto had reached
this point by the early twentieth century.  Harris threw up his hands
in surrender.  And so the University of Toronto history project
faltered, and continued to falter, as I began to reach those chapters
of my own book that dealt with higher education in Ontario after
the Great War. 
The increasing attention I gave to the University of Toronto for
the period after 1918 reflected of course its growing importance
and influence in Canadian higher education.  I had direct experi-
ence of this.  My undergraduate education at the University of
Manitoba was peppered with professors sent by people like A.S.P.
Woodhouse or Donald Creighton  to the regional “colonies” of the
nation. The manner of these men reflected, at times, a wistful yearn
to return to the imperial heartland, and this did not escape even the
naïve undergraduate.  But the amount of historical detail Matters
of Mind afforded to the University of Toronto also reflected my
decision that if a comprehensive history of the University of
Toronto was not going to be written in my lifetime (as I then
thought), much less before the deadline for submission of my
manuscript, I would damn well provide for others as much of what
I had come to know about the institution—even if this risked
distorting the overall cast of the book.  If only one graduate student
published some serious research on an aspect of the University of
Toronto’s history my book helped reveal, I thought the gamble
would have paid off. I did not remotely expect that the U of T
310 Historical Studies in Education/Revue d’histoire de l’éducation
1  Paul Axelrod and John G. Reid, eds., Youth, University and Canadian Society: Essays
in the Social History of Higher Education (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1989).
2  Claude T. Bissell, Halfway Up Parnassus: A Personal Account of the University of
Toronto, 1932-1971 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,1974).
history project would assume new life, or that it would then take
the vigorous direction marked by Martin Friedland and his co-
workers. The choice of Friedland, as we all now know, was an
inspired one—and his magisterial history has left us profoundly in
his debt.
Back in 1989, a year that truly marked the end of an epoch if
not a century, Paul Axelrod and John Reid posed a historio-
graphical challenge to scholars of higher education in Canada,
urging them—well, us—to move beyond the top-down “view from
the president’s office” notion of university history.  They urged us,
instead, to approach our subjects in ways that reflected recent
directions taken by the profession—in particular, the turn to social
history, including the history of women’s experience.  The essays
in Youth, University and Canadian Society attempted to live up to
their wishes.  They incorporated social, women’s, youth, and even
a little intellectual history.1  And Paul Axelrod’s historiographical
survey for this symposium has pointed to ways taken, and works
published, over the dozen years since then.  I think it can fairly be
said that the reorientation of the history of higher education he and
Reid called for has taken place.  Most histories of university life in
Canada now incorporate as much social as institutional history; few
can now ignore the realm of the social. 
In his charming memoir, Halfway Up Parnassus, former
Toronto President Claude Bissell reflected affectionately on the
“great, good place” the University of Toronto had become by the
time he himself became a student at it.2  These were years, begin-
ning in the early 1930s and lasting until the late 1950s, when, in
Bissell’s nostalgic and romanticized view, the University of
Toronto had “centeredness,” a combination of community and
gravitas, a sense of collegiality and fellowship.  An “ivory tower,”
in Bissell’s view, in the best sense: free from acrimony, from
student unrest, and from professorial dissension.  And it was a
place, as Martin Friedland’s new history and other recent scholar-
ship indicates, that never truly existed.  Even so, its wistful traces
continue to serve as the not-too-hidden subtext of polemics such as
Bercuson, Bothwell, and Granatstein’s The Great Brain Robbery
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in 1984 and Granatstein’s more recent diatribe Who Killed
Canadian History?  in 1998.3
History is seldom well served by nostalgia, and this is espe-
cially the case with the history of universities. Yet the history of
higher education, almost always written by university-educated
people, is especially susceptible to nostalgia’s sepia-tinted charms.
It is often very difficult, even for the most “objectivity-conscious”
historian, not in some way to construct a “great, good place” of
some sort, of some time. It is difficult, for example, not to measure
earlier or later generations against the days of one’s own university
education. In too many of our accounts of universities, either the
past or the present is bleak.  Sometimes we emphasize liberation
from prejudice and inequality and outmoded forms of thought, and
at others we chart higher education’s subordination to the dictates
of the state, the reduction of professor to employee, or of student to
consumer. Yet almost inevitably, when we either romanticize or
demonize, we risk falling back into what Paul Axelrod has
characterized as the “struggle and survival” mode. Either way, we
remain halfway up Parnassus, and either way we risk having
trajectories of either improvement or declension in mind. In this, I
am by no means blameless.
This is perhaps less problematic with “case studies” on
particular aspects of higher education. In them, the overarching
meta-narrative of rise or decline has decidedly less chance to come
into play, for attention to detail is a good antidote to both nostalgia
and unwarranted criticism.  But we still need to be wary of creating
our own great, good  places—or bad ones—when we shift to broad
accounts of institutions as a whole or of university systems. What,
then, might serve in the place of such overarching teleological
categories as “Progress and Decline,” or  functionalist  variants
such as “Struggle and Survival” or “Challenge and Response”? 
Here I want to suggest two fruitful directions we might
consider. I think they might help address the problem of institu-
tional and social trajectories and at the same time provide us with
a means of re-situating ourselves as historians of higher education
within the still-shifting historiographical terrain of the years since
Axelrod and Reid penned their clarion call to varieties of social
history.
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In the late 1970s, Tony Becher, a professor of philosophy at the
University of Sussex, came across an unpublished paper by Clifford
Geertz, the American champion of what is now known as “inter-
pretive anthropology.”  The paper was called “Towards an
Ethnography of the Disciplines.”  In it, later expanded and pub-
lished in his 1983 book Local Knowledge, Geertz sought to give the
same kind of ethnographic attention to forms of contemporary
North American belief and practice he had earlier provided to
Malaysian tribes.4  Inspired by Geertz, and by T.S. Kuhn, in the
course of his reading Becher came across a passage in a book by
anthropologist F.G. Bailey, Mortality and Expediency.5 Bailey’s
words eventually served as Becher’s opening epigraph:
Each tribe has a name and a territory, settles its own
affairs, goes to war with the others, has a distinct language
or at least a distinct dialect and a variety of ways of
demonstrating its apartness from others. 
Challenged in this way, Becher decided, as he put it, “to develop
more actively my interest in mapping the variegated territory of
academic knowledge and in exploring the diverse characteristics of
those who inhabit and cultivate it” (p. xi).  Why should the high-
powered market- and consumer-driven industrial and post-indus-
trial world be exempt from the same kind of anthropological
scrutiny and analysis already afforded to “primitive” societies, for
example by studying their “natural communities” or their “life
cycles”? 
Over the next decade, Becher subjected members of a number
of disciplines in the arts, social sciences, and sciences in several
British universities, and one in the United States, to systematic
scrutiny by means of surveys, site visits, wide reading, and personal
interviews. The result, published in 1989, was Becher’s Academic
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Tribes and Territories; Intellectual Enquiry and the Culture of
Disciplines.6   It is a remarkable book.
One of the virtues of Becher’s ethnographic approach, and one
that I think should be of particular interest to the historian of higher
education, was that it circumvented the conventional categories of
understanding university life.  Becher did not view universities as
medieval institutions persisting into modernity, or as expressions
of that modernity with traces of inherited archaic structures.
Instead, he treated them as a good anthropologist treats any social
and cultural system of belief and practice, anywhere and at any
time. 
Tribes of any sort establish territories, defend them, and under
certain circumstances invade the territories of others.  They create
boundaries, at times overlapping ones.  They establish areas of
common ground. Tribes specialize, whether they are of the hunter-
gatherer or the entrepreneurial-academic variety.  They develop
their own languages, their own linguistic codes, their own arcane
vocabularies intended to impress and to exclude.  All tribes
establish pecking orders, have elites, worship Great Men and
appoint gate-keepers.  Systems of belief and actual practice
between cultural systems, in short, prove more similar on close
inspection than one might assume.  The most “primitive” of tribes
has its own form of “peer review.” 
So it is between and within  universities, and Becher scruti-
nized them with distinctly un-Whiggish eyes.  The result is a
diachronic approach to universities and their histories that we can
nevertheless incorporate into historical practice to chart change
over time.  This “academic tribes and territories” approach has
several advantages.  First, it avoids teleology, for it sees “rise” and
“decline” to be the normative—and therefore deeply problem-
atic—terms they are. Secondly, it brings processes too often
implicit or even ignored in our accounts of academic cultures into
sharp focus.  Third, it points in the direction of culture.
Let me provide one concrete example. “Cultural dispersion”
has long been a process of deep interest to anthropologists: the
spread of cultures in earlier centuries, for example, and the
commingling, control, and resistance this has entailed. Well, I await
the enterprising (and probably young) historian who will trace the
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graduate students supervised by Harold Innis, Donald Creighton,
Maurice Careless, and Carl Berger over the period 1945 to 1995.
I’m looking forward to examining the dispersion map (if there
exists such a thing) that will highlight the universities and cities in
which those students later gained appointments. The detailed,
analytical text accompanying elements of the map will have
examined and assessed the history courses and curricula these
Toronto graduates created once they had reached the colonies. 
A number of years ago, in his presidential address to the
Canadian Historical Association, on doctoral theses produced in
1967 and 1985, William Acheson gave us tantalizing hints at how
fruitful this approach to the dispersion of disciplinary culture and
its attendant interpretive influence could be—but it marked merely
a beginning.7  We could do much more.  Imagine for a moment
those Toronto history grads as a number of larger or smaller circles
on the map—coloured, of course, Royal Blue.  The more U of T
people on staff, the larger the circle.  Outposts of academic empire.
Then think of other sets of circles, representing doctoral students
produced by those universities that developed doctoral programs in
history, especially after 1970.  Our enterprising scholar will also
have studied the courses they developed, and will have compared
their orientation with those offered at the University of Toronto.
This is where the historian finally gets to dream in technicol-
our, like the Film Studies folks.  For there are those Toronto and
non-Toronto graduates, on the map, in several fascinating hues.
The Baby Blue ones are those trained by the Royal Blue fellows in
the “new universities,” and they have won their own symbolic
colour because when they dispersed to the colonies they often
turned out to be pale imitations of the Genuine Article back near
University Avenue.  Many other “new  university” circles, large
and small, would be “Blood Red,” of course, to represent the New
Left social history orientation of most such places.  There they are,
too, on the map—right over the cities where their academic posts
are located—sometimes alone, at other times competing for space
with the blue circles.  And if we compared dispersion maps focused
on 1945, 1955, 1965, through 1995—we would see, at first, the
diffusion of Royal Blue and the birth of Baby Blue; and then we
would see the red circles increase in number, slowly at first, and
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then multiplying  rapidly—an academic metastasis, either malig-
nant or life-saving depending on our affinity for blue or red.  In a
large inset map of Toronto itself, the space south of Eglinton would
be almost solid blue, while up near Keele Street we would see a
clash of Blue and Red not witnessed since the Battle of the Plains
of  Abraham.
You think I jest?  Well, only in part. A serious and well-
conceived version of this intentionally simplistic dispersion map,
with its accompanying analytical text, would  provide us with a
very helpful visual representation of dominant and resistant
interpretive stances within Canadian historiography.8  Do that over
time, watch the number of blue circles become surrounded and
often overtaken by red ones (which remarkably begin to fade to
pink after 1989), and you will have one means of  literally charting
a challenge to one institution’s intellectual power and influence,
and also a revolution in Canadian historiography.  A visual
representation, in time and space, of the actual decline and fall of
the Creightonian “Empire of the St. Lawrence.”
Academic tribes and territories? You bet. 
Earlier, I indicated that I wanted to suggest “a means of re-
situating ourselves as historians of higher education within the
shifting historiographical terrain” of the past decade or so.
Becher’s unique and fresh approach to academic cultures leads in
this direction too.  For not only does it provide us with new
questions to ask, it also is grounded in “the relationship between
people and ideas.”  In short, as with the drift of Clifford Geertz’s
interpretive anthropology as a whole, it shifts attention to the
mental environment in which cultural meaning is generated.
Becher’s central contention is “that the ways in which particular
groups of academics organize their professional lives are intimately
related to the intellectual tasks on which they are engaged.”  One
can, and should, “seek to draw a distinction between the social
aspects of knowledge communities and the epistemological
properties of knowledge forms,” but in doing so one will soon see
“how the two influence one another” (p. 2).  This leads to the
second suggested direction we might consider.
The past thirty years, the heyday of social history, witnessed
abundant attention to the various “social aspects of knowledge
communities.” In Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman, Mrs. Willie
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Loman insists that “attention must be paid” to her late husband. It
is the one debt owed to him.  We have long since studied social and
ideological structures, and this steady gaze has issued dividends.
But we now have some historiographical critical distance from the
rise and influence of the New Social History, and more than one
historian has concluded of late that it reached a kind of interpretive
impasse by the decade of the 1990s, if not earlier.  “Social struc-
ture,” like “number,” proved to have certain limitations.  Attention
must be paid, this time to sites of meaning.
In 2001, an article by William H. Sewell, Jr. appeared in a
volume called Schools of Thought: Twenty-Five years of Interpre-
tive Social Science.  Entitled “Whatever Happened to the ‘Social’
in Social History?,” the article began with the words “Social
History as an intellectual project is in crisis.”9  With its concern for
social structures and the quantitative methods used for studying
them, Sewell noted, social history rose in the 1960s and 1970s to a
position of dominance within the profession.  At the time, “social
structures” had been assumed to be “objective and transpersonal
patterns of forces of which actors were at best incompletely aware
and which tightly constrained their actions and thoughts.”  Along
with this assumption came a disdain for traditional narrative
history.  So the social historians of the 1960s and 1970s turned for
their models, as often as not, to sociology, political science,
economics, and geography.  The New Social History became an
eclectic mixture of the French Annales school, British Marxism,
and American quantitative empiricism.
And yet even by the mid-1970s some of these social historians
recognized that social history had serious limits.  They knew about
social constraints and social forces that shaped people’s lives, all
right, but the methods they had chosen did little for understanding
how people actually made sense of these forces and constraints, and
grappled with them. The use of hard data did not really address
questions of meaning and motivation—a problem that surely helps
explain the frenetic quest to discover “agency” wherever later
social historians thought they might find it. In short, social history
had largely ignored the question of culture—the environment in
which meaning is created.
This accounts, in part, for why some of them (like Bryan D.
Palmer and Gregory S. Kealey) turned to British “cultural Marx-
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ism,” while others (like Tony Becher and William Sewell) looked
to forms of anthropological understanding, especially to the work
of “symbolic anthropologists” like Clifford Geertz and Victor
Turner.10  The overall effect was that it drew attention to the realm
of the symbolic—to the social and cultural practices which occupy
the realm of meaning. This in turn forged links to intellectual
history, for intellectual historians had always been concerned with
such issues. 
This increase of attention to the cultural in the context of the
social brought into play interpretive methods that could uncover
systems of meaning, such as Raymond Williams’s “structures of
feeling.”11  And these kinds of structures were no less real or far-
reaching in their implications than the social ones uncovered by
quantitative research.  Secondly, in shifting attention toward the
cultural in this way, historians began to restore to history a place
for meaning in thought, belief, and action that had often been
ridiculed when the “new social historians” of the 1960s and 1970s
talked about intellectual history.  Largely marginalized in the
heyday of the New Social History, this reorientation in historiogra-
phy is now all around us, for example in Jonathan Vance’s Death
So Noble (1997) or in H.V. Nelles’s The Art of Nation-Building
(1999)—books literally inconceivable three decades ago.12 
Our own field of study, for all its decided advances, is by
comparison conceptually static.  We still have much to do in order
to establish the actual facts and experiences of Canadian academic
life.  We must continue to strip away inaccuracy, conjecture, and
unexamined assumption.  Our attention to the analytical categories
of social history—institutional structures, social groups, demogra-
phy, and so forth—has borne much fruit, but how significantly have
we expanded our methods beyond those urged upon us by Axelrod
and Reid a dozen years ago?  We need to think more about the
ways meaning is generated within academic life—how it is
cultivated, mediated, contested, resisted, and reconstituted. This
will involve looking at evidence with new questions and  with fresh
eyes, but it will first require a frank evaluation of our own operat-
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ing assumptions, both disciplinary and personal As the English
historian of political philosophy, Quentin Skinner, has recently
suggested,
If we accept that the social and political world is inter-
preted through and through, and that there may be many
conflicting yet defensible interpretations circulating at any
one time, we must apply that thought to ourselves as well.
We cannot consistently speak about different defensible
interpretations while uniquely privileging our own partic-
ular body of beliefs. We have to see ourselves as one tribe
among others.13
To understand the past, we need to address more directly the
question of meaning,  and to do this adequately a theoretically
informed critical attitude is not quite enough.  Along with it, we
need also to cultivate something that the youthful and exuberant
New  Social History of the 1960s and 1970s often  neglected or
even derided: an empathetic understanding of other “tribes” and
earlier generations.14  If the history of the twentieth century has
taught us anything, it is that recent peoples and generations can
claim little if any intellectual, ethical, or moral superiority over
their forebears.  So, too, it is with higher education.  If the heart of
the history of meaning is located anywhere, it is perhaps best found
in universities.  To understand how meaning is created, sustained,
and altered we need to pay greater heed to the cultural within the
context of the social.  We need to enjoin social and ideological
processes and structures to cultural and intellectual ones.  We need
to do all of this and more if we wish to understand, in the sweep of
time, the interaction of people and ideas in Canadian universities
and the tribes and territories they inhabit.
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